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FOREWORD: POST-CHICAGO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
RANDY E. BARNETT* 
INTRODUCTION: A NEW ERA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
This is not another "law-and-econ" bashing symposium. Nor is the 
symposium's title intended to denigrate Chicago School law and econom-
ics any more than the term "Post-Keynesian economics" was intended to 
denigrate the work of John Maynard Keynes. Instead, this symposium 
marks the fact that many practitioners of law and economics have moved 
well beyond the stereotypes familiar to most legal academics. Rather 
than designating an entirely new school of thought, the term "Post-Chi-
cago law and economics" refers to a new era in which a variety of new 
questions about law and lawmaking is being asked and a variety of prom-
ising economic techniques is being used to answer them. 
Yet most legal academics who, like me, are not part of the law and 
economics movement are generally unaware of these changes. The pur-
pose of this "Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics" is to 
bring some of these new methods and questions to the attention of main-
stream legal academics and others. The hope is that those who have 
shunned the economic analysis of law in the past may wish to reconsider 
their stance in light of what Post-Chicago law and economics has to of-
fer. To facilitate this, I will use this Foreword to summarize the new 
directions suggested by each of the symposium contributors, most of 
whom are practitioners of law and economics. 
I. EXPANDING THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
In his symposium article, 1 Robert Ellickson suggests that the time 
has come for practitioners of law and economics to take seriously Arthur 
Leff's well-known criticism of the dominant "rational-actor" model em-
ployed by law and economics. 2 "Despite the unarguable costs of com-
plexity," Professor Ellickson says, "economists should now seek to 
* Professor and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law. This Foreword was written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the North-
western University School of Law. 
I. Ellickson. Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical 
Law-and-Economics, 65 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) (Professor Ellickson's paper appears in this 
symposium issue). 
2. See Left', Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism. 60 VA. L. REV. 451 
(1974). 
3 
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modify the rational-actor paradigm in order to give it greater power."3 
In particular, he urges that insights provided by psychology and sociol-
ogy could be integrated into economic analysis. He believes that such 
improvements would not necessitate "a paradigm shift-like that from 
Ptolemy to Copernicus-but rather only a paradigm improvement-like 
that from Copernicus to Kepler."4 
Professor Ellickson begins by presenting some empirical indications 
that, while law and economics is hardly in decline, it has ceased to grow 
in recent years. He reports that both the number of law professors with 
doctorates in economics at Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale law 
schools and the proportion of articles with a law and economics slant 
published in the law reviews of these four schools have held relatively 
constant since 1970.5 He also presents evidence that, while law and eco-
nomics has spread throughout academia since 1970, even this process of 
diffusion appears to have slowed or stopped. 6 Moreover, the increased 
professionalization of law and economics has tended to confine its use to 
specialists. "Today, when many of the obvious and easy applications 
have been done," he observes, "a young scholar with only a modest 
amount of technical training can no longer be as optimistic about being 
able to make a contribution."7 Ellickson believes that by enriching its 
model with insights provided by modern psychology and sociology, law 
and economics may experience a renewal and growth. Psychology pro-
vides information about the internal influences of human behavior, while 
sociology provides information about the external influences on human 
behavior. 
A. Integrating Insights from Psychology 
In his discussion of psychology, Professor Ellickson summarizes the 
findings of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman that when 
confronted with a choice among a set of prospects, a person is likely to 
use an arbitrary reference point to judge whether achieving a particu-
lar prospect would constitute a loss or a foregone gain. This has conse-
quences because a person is likely to be loss-averse, that is, to regard a 
loss from a reference point as more momentous than foregoing an ap-
parently equivalent gain from that same reference point. 8 
Professor Ellickson gives two examples of how this insight from psy-
3. Ellickson, supra note I, at 25. 
4. /d. at 26. 
5. /d. at 26-27. 
6. /d. at 30-32 
7. /d. at 33. 
8. /d. at 35. 
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chology may be usefuliy applied to law. First, in the takings area this 
analysis "predicts that an ordinary landowner would feel the loss of a 
psychologically vested right of a given market value more keenly than he 
would the loss of a prospect (a psychologically unvested right) of identi-
cal market value."9 The second example is in the area of adverse posses-
sion, where "even a knowing adverse possessor would eventually start 
regarding the possessed land not as a prospect but rather as a vested 
right" 10 and where "during a period of adverse possession an absent true 
owner would likely be psychologically pulling up stakes, thereby becom-
ing less likely to frame as a 'loss' the possible relinquishment of the land 
to the adverse possessor." 11 
Professor Ellickson then summarizes the research of Henry Simon 
regarding the limitations of human cognitive capacities. "The reality 
that cognitive limitations impair the learning of law makes legal instru-
mentalism much more difficult. An analyst must become involved in the 
messy matter of the extent to which actors will respond to formal legal 
signals." 12 Professor Ellickson would use this insight from psychology to 
examine when a legal system should take into account human cognitive 
limitations, 13 the "legibility" oflegal rules to persons whose conduct they 
are supposed to guide, 14 and the role of such intermediaries as lawyers, 
reporters, and insurance companies in providing ex ante legal informa-
tion to actors. 15 He concludes his discussion of psychology by briefly 
considering the possible implications of cognitive barriers to dissonant 
information for consumer protection and workers compensation stat-
utes, 16 as well as the limitations on a person's ability to "unfailingly exe-
cute decisions made about his own future conduct." 17 
B. Integrating Insights from Sociology 
Next, Professor Ellickson discusses some ways that insights from 
sociology can improve economic analysis. In contrast to "mainstream 
economic theory [that] takes tastes as exogenous givens ... [s]ome econ-
omists, and also some critics of economics, have striven to speculate on 
9. /d. at 37-38. 
10. /d. at 39. 
II. /d. 
12. /d. at 40-41. 
13. /d. at 41. 
14. /d. at 40-42. 
15. /d. at 42. 
16. /d. at 42-43. 
17. /d. at 43. 
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the origin and legitimacy of preferences." 18 Aside from "deepening the 
normative power of economics," he thinks "a successful theory of taste 
formation would enable economists better to make positive predictions of 
shifts in supply and demand curves." 19 After sketching his own "sugges-
tive model" of the internalization of culture, 20 he applies this model to 
three contexts of human behavior: economic exchange, social, exchange, 
and political behavior. 21 With respect to political behavior, he explains 
how the inculturation model may enrich public choice analysis22 of legis-
lative and judicial behavior.23 "The mark of a true economist," Professor 
Ellickson concludes, "is not fealty to the classical rational-actor model, 
but rather openness to a.p.y technique that would improve understanding 
of complex human behavior."24 
C Judge Posner Replies 
In The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 25 
Judge Richard Posner responds both to Professor Ellickson's empirical 
claim that the law and economics movement is losing steam and to his 
suggestion that law and economics could use a healthy dose of psychol-
ogy and sociology. Although he questions the strength of the evidence 
supporting Professor Ellickson's claim, assuming the claim is correct, 
Judge Posner offers four possible explanations for the phenomenon. 
First, at some point the relative growth of any portion of the law school 
curriculum must cease. 26 Second, space must be made for new interdisci-
plinary movements, such as feminist jurisprudence, law and literature, 
and critical legal studies. 27 Third, given the opportunity costs of econo-
mists, it "is cheaper to fill teaching slots with refugees from the humani-
ties, alumni of public-interest firms, and aspiring constitutional 
18. /d. at 44-45. One of the economists cited by Ellickson as having explored this issue is Lewis 
Kornhauser, another contributor to this symposium. See id. at 45 n.67. 
19. /d. at 45. 
20. /d. at 45-48. 
21. /d. at 48-55. 
22. !d. at 51-52. "Public choice" analysis is another facet of Post-Chicago law and economics 
that only recently has begun to receive the widespread attention oflegal academics. See. e.g., Farber 
& Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987). The public choice 
approach is examined in this symposium by Jerry Mashaw and Dan Farber. See infra notes 61-106 
and accompanying text (summarizing their contributions). 
23. Ellickson, supra note I, at 52-55. The use of economic analysis to analyze judicial behavior 
is represented here by the contribution of Lewis Kornhauser and a comment by Jonathon Macey. 
See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text (summarizing their contributions). 
24. Ellickson, supra note I, at 55. 
25. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 57 (1989) (Judge Posner's comment appears in this symposium issue). 
26. /d. at 57. 
27. /d. at 57-58. 
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lawyers."28 Finally, Judge Posner maintains that an empirical discipline 
can make little headway in the absence of empirical inquiry. Yet "law 
professors have neither training nor taste for systematic empirical re-
search, which would inevitably involve statistical analysis."29 
Judge Posner cautions against using other disciplines to "supply a 
facile explanation for every regularity (or peculiarity) in human behav-
ior,"30 explanations that cannot be tested empirically. "[T]oo many bells 
and whistles," he says, "will stop the analytic engine in its tracks."31 
Abandoning the simple rational-actor model prematurely may cause 
economists to overlook straightforward explanations of behavior. More-
over, much of modem sociology and anthropology, he says, is implicitly 
economic in its methods. 32 
Finally, because the premise of this symposium is that law and eco-
nomics has moved into a new era, it is significant that at one point Judge 
Posner implicitly acknowledges this development. Responding to Profes-
sor Ellickson's call to broaden the economic model, Judge Posner cites to 
his own writings and observes that "[t]o some extent ... Ellickson is 
preaching to the converted."33 He notes that economists are already in-
corporating altruism and information costs, for example, into their 
analysis. 34 
II. FROM SUBSTANCE TO PROCESS 
Traditional law and economics has mainly focused its attention on 
the consequences of what H.L.A. Hart calls the "primary rules" that 
regulate individual conduct. 35 Post-Chicago law and economics is ex-
tending the focus of economic analysis beyond the substance of the law to 
the judicial and legislative processes that generate and enforce primary 
rules. This expanded inquiry includes the procedural "secondary 
rules"36 that regulate those persons who administer the legal system. 
28. /d. at 58. 
29. /d. 
30. /d. at 62. 
31. /d. 
32. /d. at 60. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. 
35. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (1961) ("primary rules are concerned with the 
actions that individuals must or must not do"). 
36. /d. ("secondary rules ... specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively 
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined''). 
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A. The Economic Analysis of the Judicial Process 
In discussing the potential contribution of inculturation models on 
the law and economics model, Robert Ellickson observes that recogniz-
ing the role of ideology in judicial decision-making is "a conspicuous 
break from the Chicagoan orthodoxy that ideas don't matter."37 Law 
and economics scholars, he says, have "yet to confront the murky issues 
that arise once one admits the influence of ideology on judges. "38 
Jonathan Macey notes that "[e]conomists have had virtually nothing to 
say about judicial decision-making in general or stare decisis in particu-
lar."39 Lewis Kornhauser begins his symposium article by observing: 
"To the normative question 'How ought judges to decide cases?' some 
economic analysts, though not all, respond: Judges ought to decide cases 
to promote efficiency. To the positive question, ... 'By what principles 
or practices of reasoning do judges in fact decide cases?' -economic ana-
lysts of law have remained silent."40 
1. Professor Kornhauser's Analysis of Stare Decisis 
Professor Kornhauser brings the tools of economic analysis to bear 
on an aspect of judicial decisionmaking that has, until now, been consid-
ered the turf of legal philosophy: what is the nature of legal reasoning? 
He seriously examines the requirement of formal justice that "like cases 
should be treated alike." He frames his inquiry as follows: "Phrased in 
its starkest form, stare decisis 'requires' a judge, once she has determined 
that the instant case is governed by a prior decision, to adhere to that 
prior decision even when she believes that prior decision to have been 
wrongly decided."41 In sum, he asks: "What justifies adherence to a de-
cision known to be wrong?"4 2 
Although I cannot fairly summarize Professor Kornhauser's intri-
cate analysis here, I can explain how, in addition to its focus on the sec-
ondary rules governing lawmaking, it exemplifies three other distinctive 
features of Post-Chicago law and economics. First, the manner in which 
he frames the issue requires a close consideration of the possibility of 
judicial errors. In other words, Professor Kornhauser's analysis does not 
assume that judges have "perfect information" of either the law or facts 
37. Ellickson, supra note I, at 53. 
38. /d. at 53-54. 
39. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 39, 39 (1989) (Professor Macey's comment appears in this symposium issue). 
40. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 63, 63 
(1989) (citations omitted) (Professor Kornhauser's article appears in this symposium issue). 
41. /d. at 66. 
42. /d. 
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of disputes and, instead, identifies four potential sources of erroneous ju-
dicial decisions: changes in values, changes in the world, improvements 
in information, and incompetence.43 He then uses this analysis to criti-
cally assess three "jurisprudential" justifications of adhering to erroneous 
decisions: fairness, competence, and certainty.44 
Second, at a crucial juncture of the analysis, he employs the tech-
niques of game theory to explain how participants in a legal system may 
find it in their interest to agree to a regime of stare decisis even when they 
disagree over the more basic values of the system.45 Although long 
known to economists and philosophers, the use of game theory to assess 
problems of coordination in the absence of perfect information is new to 
legal analysis and is one of the distinctive analytic methods associated 
with Post-Chicago law and economics. 
Third, in contrast to what he terms "the standard assumptions of 
the economic analysis of accident law,"46 Professor Kornhauser presents 
a model which attempts to incorporate an element of uncertainty created 
by a changing world. 47 Indeed, it is impossible even to consider stare 
decisis without taking time and change into account, for the doctrine 
requires that a rule announced at one point in time be adhered to at some 
later time. 48 
2. The Value of Process: Professor Macey's Comment 
Professor Kornhauser concludes his analysis of stare decisis with the 
intriguing observation that "the paradox of stare decisis most often 
emerges only when the substantive values of the judges differ from the 
criteria that determine when two cases are equivalent. "49 This potential 
discrepancy between the substance of legal decisions and the formal pro-
cess that produces legal decisions provides Jonathan Macey with a point 
of departure from Professor Kornhauser's analysis of stare decisis. By 
stressing the relationship between substantive and procedural concerns, 
43. !d. at 68-73. 
44. !d. at 7 3-78. 
45. !d. at 78-82. 
46. !d. at 82, n.JI. 
47. To this end, he modifies a model presented in Blume & Rubinfeld. Tire Dynamics of tire 
Legal Process, II J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1982). 
48. For a discussion of how standard ecmiomic methods inadequately take time into account. 
see G. O'DRISCOI.I. & M. RIZZO, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE 2-J ( 1985). 
49. Kornhauser, supra note 40. at 91. I discuss the usefulness of these diff~rent perspecti,·es in 
Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendmelll and Constitutional Legitimacy. 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
'l7, 41-47 (1988). I examine the valu" of distinct. competing modes of analysis in Burnett. Foreword: 
Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibility of Moral Rights and Consequentialist A11alyses. 12 H.\RV. 
1. L. & Pun. POl 'y 611, 634-35 (1989) (l1ereinafter Chickens & Eggs). 
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Professor Macey's analysis of the doctrine of stare decisis further elabo-
rates this important dimension of Post-Chicago law and economics. 
Professor Macey begins by questioning whether Professor Korn-
hauser's evaluation of the procedural characteristic of stare decisis takes 
substantive uncertainty seriously enough. "[C]entral to Professor Korn-
hauser's model is the assumption that judges actually know what the so-
cially desirable outcome is. . . . By phrasing the question in this way, 
however, Professor Kornhauser presumes that judges enjoy a far greater 
degree of certainty about the socially desirable outcome in a particular 
case than they actually do."50 Professor Macey thinks that, by adopting 
this assumption, Professor Kornhauser overlooks three significant advan-
tages of stare decisis. First, it "enables judges to leverage a single skill-
the ability to tell when like cases are alike-into a facility for deciding a 
wide variety of cases that involve substantive legal issues about which the 
judges may know next to nothing."51 Second, it enables judges to "allo-
cate their human capital in such a way as to become expert in a particu-
lar field, such as admiralty, criminal procedure, or securities regulation, 
confident that they can rely on other judges' expertise in the areas in 
which they have not specialized. " 52 Third, the ability offallible judges to 
check their conclusions against those reached by other judges helps them 
to avoid errors of judgment. 53 
While traditional law and economics typically assumes that the sub-
stantively correct outcome can readily be discerned for individual cases, 
each of the advantages of stare decisis identified by Professor Macey only 
accrues if judges (and even academic commentators) often are unable to 
make a "substantively" correct decision in individual cases. Professor 
Macey concludes that the "idea of stare decisis requires that we appreci-
ate the intractable problem of uncertainty that plagues judges when they 
decide cases. . . . In other words, stare decisis can be justified only on the 
grounds that it provides a basis for judicial decision-making when judges 
don't know what the correct answer is. " 54 In a world of perfect decision-
making, adhering to such procedural constraints as stare decisis would be 
unnecessary_ and irrational, but Post-Chicago law and economics does 
not assume such a world. 
To evaluate Professor Kornhauser's thesis, Professor Macey 
presents his own four-fold economic analysis of stare decisis-an analysis 
SO. Macey, supra note 39, at 94-95. 
5 I. !d. at 95. 
52. !d. 
53. !d. 
54. !d. 
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that explores the relationship between substance and process. First, Pro-
fessor Macey analyzes the doctrine's ability to assist judges in making 
substantively correct legal decisions. 55 Second, he considers how stare 
decisis increases information concerning the substance of the law, 
thereby decreasing the incidence of litigation. 56 Third, he suggests that 
stare decisis helps appellate courts identify when trial judges have "de-
cide[d] cases in ways that are more consistent with their own preferences 
than with the preferences of society as a whole."57 Stare decisis also 
makes it possible for a judicial system to establish much-needed conven-
tions in situations where it matters less which rule is adopted than it does 
that some rule be adopted uniformly. 58 
Employing Professor Kornhauser's distinction between strong and 
weak versions of stare decisis, 59 Professor Macey concludes his comment 
by offering a "public choice" account of why judges may find it in their 
interest to adhere to a weak form of the doctrine rather than abandon the 
doctrine or adopt a stronger version. 60 Professor Macey often uses pub-
lic choice analysis in his wriiings in public law fields, and it is to this 
dimension of Post-Chicago law and economics that I now turn. 
B. The Economic Analysis of the Legislative Process 
Although Jerry Mashaw acknowledges in his symposium article the 
"rich history of law and economics talk in public law fields," 61 he ob-
serves that only in the last decade has public choice theory begun to 
appear in legal scholarship. "And only within the last four or five years 
have debates about the relevance of such things as 'interest group theory' 
and 'Arrow's Theorem' begun to achieve prominence in legal academic 
discussions of constitutional and administrative Ia w and statutory inter-
pretation. " 62 For Professor Mashaw, this application of economic analy-
sis to public law is distinctive from previous efforts insofar as "the issues 
posed and sometimes answered by the new political economy are almost 
exclusively issues of institutional structure and decisionmaking process 
rather than issues of substantive policy."63 Thus, Post-Chicago law and 
55. /d. at 102-106. 
56. /d. at 106-107. 
57. /d. at 108. 
58. !d. at 108-109. 
59. Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 73-74. 
60. Macey. supra note 39, at 112-13. 
61. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and The Understanding of Public Law. 65 C~H.·KENT 
L. REV. 123, 124 (1989) (Professor Mashaw's article appears in this symposium issue). 
62. /d. at 124-25. 
63. /d. at 125. 
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economics' shift of focus in the legislative sphere from substance to pro-
cess parallels its shift in focus from the substance of judicial decisions to 
the process of judicial decision-making. 
1. Public Choice Analysis of Politics and Legislation 
Professor Mashaw begins his article by describing the issues that 
currently divide scholars who take public choice analysis seriously. He 
identifies two strands of the public choice approach: decision theory and 
interest group theory. 
The first is a branch of decision theory symbolized and much-informed 
by Kenneth Arrow's general possibility theorem. This literature is 
concerned predominantly with the structure of voting rules and with 
the effect of voting structures on the outcome of collective decision-
making. . . . The second branch ... [is] unified by a basic axiom: 
Political actions are to be explained in terms of a simple hypothesis 
concerning human behavior-people act to further their own material 
interests. 64 
Although his paper deals primarily with the second of these two 
branches, interest group theory, Professor Mashaw maintains that both 
are "essential for an overall theory of political action. We need to under-
stand both how individuals behave, or are likely to behave, and how their 
resulting collective action may be shaped or influenced by the institutions 
and decision rules through which that action is mediated. "65 
Because early efforts to apply interest group theory to public law 
have become controversial, Professor Mashaw examines two principal 
criticisms of this branch of public choice theory. First is the normative 
criticism that public choice insights obstruct the effort to construct an 
ethically attractive public law. Second is the criticism that public choice 
theory is an inaccurate depiction of the real world of public law. His aim 
is not to refute all criticism of public choice, but to show that it is prema-
ture to kill the public choice baby in its crib. 
a. The Normative Merits of Interest Group Theory 
Professor Mashaw summarizes the normative critique as follows: 
According to this view, the purpose of collective action is not just to do 
something that has already been determined to serve the individual 
ends of the participants, but instead to discover and express collective 
or public purposes. Hence, the institutions of public or collective 
choice must be constructed to facilitate collective or public discovery 
and expression of public ideals and public demands. Public choice the-
64. /d. at 126. 
65. /d. 
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ory's view of collective choice mechanisms as mere techniques for pref-
erence aggregation, and of individual participation in public choice as 
aimed merely at achieving the most advantageous bargain given pre-
existing individual preferences, cannot possibly lead to an appropriate 
understanding of how citizens or officeholders should behave in their 
public roles or of how public institutions should be understood or 
designed. 66 
13 
Mashaw suggests that critics have mistaken the positive claims of interest 
group theory for normative claims. Public choice is offered as a poten-
tially valuable explanatory technique in a world where assertions of pub-
lic-interest by political actors are not easily assessed and are often 
insincere. Public choice adherents do not claim that all public institu-
tions should be nothing more than mechanisms of interest group satisfac-
tion; instead they think that the interest group assumption illuminates 
the legislative process. To quarrel with this response, however, requires 
an assessment of the descriptive merits of the public choice method. 
Deserving of more serious consideration, Mashaw thinks, are the 
potentially adverse effects of the public choice way of thinking on public 
morality. This criticism is analogous to the claim that judges who accept 
the teachings of legal realism end up debasing the judicial process when 
they act consistently with these teachings. It also resembles the claim 
that acceptance of the philosophy of legal positivism by German judges 
contributed to the perversion of their legal system. These criticisms all 
share the assumption that, when they are internalized by individual ac-
tors, descriptive theories can be self-fulfilling prophesies with norma-
tively unattractive implications. An irony occurs when those who offer 
this criticism of public choice "realism" in the legislative process simulta-
neously embrace a realist perspective on the judicial process. 
Mashaw responds by examining the impact that interest group the-
ory appears to have had on institutional reform. 67 Although he thinks 
interest group theory has heavily permeated the reform efforts of the past 
three decades, "[t]he activist optimism of the 1960s has been replaced by 
pessimism bordering on the cynical. . . . For some, the only public pur-
pose worthy of respect seems to be the elimination of the public sector 
itself. " 68 With the increasing cognizance of public choice insights among 
legal academics, Professor Mashaw sees this attitude carrying over to the 
domain of statutory interpretation. In place of a presumption of public 
interest, statutes may be viewed as compromise bargains between con-
tending factions. Professor Mashaw explains why "one should expect 
66. /d. at 128-29. 
67. /d. at 131-33. 
68. /d. at 13J. 
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that this new learning would induce courts to be positivist in their legal 
philosophy, formalist in their approach to constitutional legitimacy and 
literalist in their interpretive technique. " 69 He then presents evidence in-
dicating that "the jurisprudence of the Burger court, as well as its Rehn-
quistian successor, . . . is at least congruent with the public choice 
perspective. " 70 
Professor Mashaw also relates the reply to this normative criticism 
offered by Nobel laureate James Buchanan, the father of modern public 
choice ("Virginia School") economics. According to Professor 
Buchanan, the model is constructed to enable the discovery of mecha-
nisms that can effectively guard against the very type of self-aggrandizing 
behavior it assumes. 71 Professor Mashaw thinks this puts Buchanan on 
the same side of the dispute about whether politics is simply the way that 
wholly exogenous preferences are satisfied "as people like Steven Kel-
man, Cass Sunstein and Mark Kelman."72 With the dispute over prefer-
ence endogeneity largely settled, Professor Mashaw thinks it is time for 
"republicanish" theorists to confront the reality of preference or taste 
formation. 73 He suspects that when they do they will find that the "stra-
tegic control of self-interest through institutional design may be essential 
both to the achievement and the maintenance of a fully rational polity."74 
He concludes that a: 
Kirkegardian leap of faith into didactic republicanism may be a good 
strategy, but it may also be folly. And in any event, it is a faith that I 
cannot will myself into. I, at least, am going to need some more per-
suading that acting as if the republican story were true will make it 
so.15 
b. The Descriptive Merits of Interest Group Theory 
After rejecting the idea that public choice should stop telling harm-
ful truths, Professor Mashaw turns his attention to those who condemn 
public choice for telling lies. He picks up where Daniel Farber and 
Philip Frickey's 1987 article, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 76 leaves 
off. Although in general agreement with their analysis, Professor 
Mashaw fears that their article "may have given too much comfort ... to 
those who would respond to its debunking of some of public choice's 
69. /d. at 135. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. at 138. 
72. !d. at 139. 
73. /d. at 140. 
74. /d. 
75. !d. at 140-41 (emphasis in original. citations omitted). 
76. See Farber & Frickey. supni note 22. 
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more extravagant claims, 'Thank God. Another field of social science we 
can safely ignore.' " 77 
Professor Mashaw agrees with Professors Farber and Frickey that 
studies establishing the beneficial effects of legislation on particular inter-
est groups "demonstrate neither that the legislation investigated is with-
out public interest effects, nor that it was adopted because of private 
interest pressures or concerns."78 Yet, according to Professor Mashaw, 
"such studies are one useful element of the 'old' law and economics ap-
proach to public law."79 Knowing who wins and who loses and by how 
much is not only "a necessary part of strategic public management, it is 
crucial to a normative consideration of whether the legislation is in the 
public interest."80 And the fact that such studies are not dispositive does 
not mean that they fail to support, to some degree, the newer public 
choice perspective on public law. 
A demonstration that legislation has big wealth distribution effects, 
combined with a demonstration that it has large costs and few benefits, 
and was enacted through a process that was highly likely to have pro-
moted nefarious forms of rent seeking by benefited groups, would pro-
vide a pretty strong indictment of a particular statute (or statutory 
provision) on public policy grounds. 81 
Professor Mashaw is concerned that some readers are likely to con-
clude from Professors Farber and Frickey's praise of ideology as a pre-
dictor of legislator behavior that the factor of self-interest can safely be 
dismissed. He considers some of the difficulties cf constructing models of 
behavior based solely on ideology,82 and of some of the methodological 
weaknesses of ideology-based studies performed to date. 83 He notes that 
Professors Farber and Frickey were careful to claim that "models con-
taining ideology and economic factors outperform purely economic mod-
els. . . . There is no claim here that pure ideological models outperform 
pure economic models. Nor can any conclusion be drawn from these 
studies about which sorts of factors are more substantial. " 84 He also at-
tempts to place in perspective Professors Farber and Frickey's discussion 
of the empirical evidence on voter behavior, 85 a discussion which he fears 
"easily could mislead those looking for reassurance that public choice 
77. Mashaw. supra note 61. at 143. 
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can safely be ignored. "86 
Finally, Professor Mashaw discusses the limits of the public choice 
approach. In particular, he criticizes the efforts of Jonathan Macey and 
Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner to infer a normative the-
ory of statutory interpretation from public choice's positive account of 
legislation. Public choice insights lead each to urge a different mode of 
statutory interpretation, and Mashaw offers brief criticisms of each. He 
concludes that the best of public choice research in this area and others 
tells us "to be skeptical of our prior Panglossian presuppositions concern-
ing the structure and dynamics of political action, but also to be skeptical 
of the public choice approach's capacity to make definitive findings." 87 
2. Public Choice in Perspective: Professor Farber's Comment 
In his comment on Professor Mashaw's article, 88 Daniel Farber dis-
cusses both the role of self-interest and ideology in the political process 
and the implications of decision theory, the other branch of public choice 
theory that Professor Mashaw describes but does not assess. Professor 
Farber re-emphasizes that, since public choice theory is "far from ma-
ture,"89 it is too early to assess its full implications for public law. In his 
view, however, "it is not too early ... to reject the profoundly pessimistic 
implications of the early public choice theories."90 
One connection between self-interest and ideology is that because 
legislators have an interest in being re-elected, it matters to them why 
voters vote the way they do. Therefore, the failure of public choice the-
ory to explain voting behavior is significant. As Farber explains: 
If the policy espoused by one of the candidates would be in . . . [a 
voter's) self-interest, she might vote for that person, but she would 
have little reason to do so, since for all practical purposes there is no 
causal link between her individual vote and that candidate's election. 
On the other hand, since something other than self-interest evidently 
motivated her to drive to the polls, that same motivation might quite 
plausibly continue to influence her in her choice of candidates.91 
However, if voters vote for ideological reasons, then the self-interest of 
legislators would make ideology relevant to the legislative decision-mak-
ing process. For this reason, Professor Farber discusses recent studies 
86. /d. at 149. 
87. /d. at 160. 
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examining the role of ideology in explaining voter behavior.92 In addi-
tion, he considers some evidence that the personal ideology of legislators 
influences their roll call votes, and some studies of particular statutes 
suggesting that their passage cannot be explained solely on grounds of 
interest group influence.93 
Thus, we have three bodies of evidence that seem to point to the same 
conclusion: the most careful econometric work, the findings of tradi-
tional social scientists, and historical investigations of the public choice 
accounts of particular legislation. . . . Only a fool would deny the 
importance of self-interest in the political process, but we can also be 
reasonably sure that self-interest is not the whole story. 94 
Professor Farber then turns his attention to "social choice" or deci-
sion theory, the "branch of public choice theory suggests the ... unpleas-
ant possibility that legislation is random and arbitrary. "95 Farber 
concedes that, "[m]ajoritarianism rests on the assumption that legislation 
is linked to majority views, but public choice theory seems to deny any 
such causal connection: outcomes are either random or driven by legisla-
tive features such as agenda rules, but in any event majority preferences 
do not translate into a meaningful collective choice."96 
Along with Professor Mashaw, Professor Farber rejects as "unreal-
istic if not unpalatable"97 the answer suggested by the more utopian 
strands of neo-republican thought,98 which is to avoid the problem of 
deciding among conflicting policies by using the political process to 
render individual preferences substantially uniform and harmonious. In-
stead, Professor Farber identifies certain institutional features of legisla-
tures that promote coherence and stability.99 He explains how 
behavioral norms such as fairness may stabilize voting outcomes even 
when voter preferences contain massive cycles. 100 
Assuming that legislatures are not wildly unstable or unpredictable, 
Professor Farber then considers the possibility that using institutional 
constraints to achieve this stability may result in a moral arbitrariness of 
legislative results. He considers the normative appeal of some of these 
constraints, such as majority rule, single-subject votes, and gatekeeper 
92. !d. at 164-65. 
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committees, the norm of fair division. 101 Moreover, although individual 
preferences may vary widely, people may still "share a common cultural 
perspective which makes their disagreements coherent and understanda-
ble to each other ... [enabling them] to identify the source of disputes, 
and to reach coherent and consistent decisions." 102 He concludes that 
"despite the possibilities of abuse, these stability-enhancing devices have 
important normative virtues." 103 
Professor Farber notes that, ironically, the decision theory dimen-
sion of public choice theory supports the neo-republican instinct that 
"arbitrary preferences in themselves are likely to be insufficient to gener-
ate coherent social choices. Rather, preferences have to be processed 
through the legislative machinery, applying norms such as fairness and 
using committees and other stability-enhancing devices." 104 He is care-
ful to add that good process does not guarantee good substance in either 
legislation or adjudication. Still, although the responsibility for making 
good choices rests with participants, a good decision-making process 
makes good substantive decisions possible. 105 He concludes that "while 
public choice methodology requires careful handling, it is potentially 
very useful." 106 
III. BEYOND COLLECTIVE WELFARE: RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
It is a very short step from the institutional constraints supported by 
a careful treatment of interest and decision theory to the rules that are 
recommended by a rational choice approach. Rational choice theory, 
moreover, opens up significant new territory to economic analysis. As 
Jules Coleman notes in his Afterword: 
Within the rational choice framework, legal rules are elements in a 
scheme of rational cooperation. The traditional economic analysis, 
which focuses entirely on the efficiency of perfect competition and the 
inefficiency of market failure, blinds us to the ways in which the dis-
tributive and productive dimensions of legal and political constraints 
are united in rational cooperation. 107 
Rational choice views legal rules as a way of closing the gap between 
the results of private maximizing behavior and the gains that can accrue 
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from cooperative behavior. Professor Coleman offers the following dis-
tinction between rational choice and traditional economic analyses.: 
In the traditional economic analysis, legal rules rectify market failures 
by encouraging efficient or Pareto optimal allocations of resources. 
This is another way of saying that legal rules have a productive dimen-
sion. The one difference is that within the rational choice perspective, 
legal rules must be both collectively and individually rational. . . . The 
individual rationality condition imposes the constraint that legal rules 
be mutually advantageous in a way in which the collective rationality 
or Pareto optimality condition does not. 10B 
For this reason, unlike traditional law and economics, a rational 
choice framework views distributional concerns as an aspect of the prob-
lem of productivity. 109 The movement toward the Pareto frontier (col-
lective rationality) is only possible with cooperation, and cooperation 
requires a distribution that is in the interest of those from whom coopera-
tive behavior is desired (individual rationality). For Professor Coleman, 
achieving individual rationality is as much a part of economic analysis as 
achieving collective rationality. This leads him to incorporate into the 
economic analysis of law a normative component that has traditionally 
been associated with social contract theory and which is championed to-
day by philosophers such as David Gauthier. 1 10 "Once we embed the 
claim that the law ought to promote efficiency or rectify market failure in 
a political or moral theory which makes that claim plausible or defensi-
ble, that is, the rational choice framework, the normative significance of 
the analytic distinction between efficiency and distribution evapo-
rates."111 Rational choice theory, unlike classical law and economics, 
views the problem of distributing the surplus created by cooperation as 
stemming from the need to motivate persons to act in the ways that make 
such cooperative gains possible. 
Professor Coleman then explains the tripartite rationality that ra-
tional choice requires. The first or search phase requires the identifica-
tion of a possible cooperative gain-what he calls collective rationality; 
the second or division phase requires a way to divide the gain-what he 
calls concession or bargaining rationality; the third or monitoring phase 
requires the investment of resources to secure compliance with the bar-
gain-what he calls individual rationality. 112 Each phase of rational 
choice corresponds to a different kind of transaction cost: search costs, 
108. !d. at 181. 
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division costs, and monitoring costs. The ability to achieve choice that is 
rational in all three ways depends upon the transaction resources that are 
available to manage the three kinds of transaction costs. These transac-
tion resources include social institutions-such as closely knit groups-
that reduce these costs, and Professor Coleman discusses the ways that 
such resources can be provided by parties to agreements. When these 
resources are provided by legal rules rather than the parties themselves, 
what in the absence of the "state" is a two party contracting problem, 
becomes, in its presence, a three party problem. That fact alone in-
creases search, division and defection problems. . . . Thus legal rules 
are never taken as given. Their explanation depends upon their relative 
costs and benefits especially in comparison with endogenous transac-
tion resources upon which the parties can draw. 113 
In Professor Coleman's opinion, "Chicago-style law and economics" 
is mistaken in a way that Ronald Coase was not. Instead of doing an 
analytic end-run around them, "[t]ransaction costs are a black box that 
needs to be filled in. It is distinctly unhelpful always to reconstruct a 
legal rule as a solution to a market failure caused by transaction 
costs." 114 The way to fill in the "transaction cost box" is (a) to identify 
the context or environment of the problem being addressed, (b) to iden-
tify both the factors in this environment that, by increasing uncertainty, 
create each of the three kinds of transaction costs (search, division, and 
monitoring) and the resources that may be available to the persons in-
volved to reduce these costs, and finally, (c) to determine whether the 
problem that a legal rule allegedly is needed to address concerns a short-
fall of resources to reduce coordination, division, or defection uncer-
tainty. 115 "Only in this way is the view of law as a response to transac-
tion costs meaningful and informative, for only then can we understand 
which sort of transaction cost is involved and which sort of endogenous 
transaction resource is in inadequate supply." 116 Professor Coleman 
concludes his Afterword by suggesting how the analytic framework of 
rational choice is useful in understanding the law of contract. 117 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The rational choice perspective described by Jules Coleman suggests 
that Post-Chicago law and economics may be seen as a limited partner-
ship between economic and philosophical methods. A few years ago I 
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described the reemergence of legal philosophy as a rival to (and also a 
reaction against) the prevailing mode of law and economics. 118 Rather 
than one movement vanquishing the other, what seems to have occurred 
is that each has learned from the other so that the gap between them is 
rapidly narrowing. 119 I also observed that the philosophical criticisms of 
law and economics may make "possible a challenge to the orthodoxy of 
Posnerian efficiency .... " 120 Post-Chicago law and economics appears to 
represent this challenge. However, by now it should be evident that 
Post-Chicago law and economics is neither a wholesale rejection of the 
older law and economics nor a single school of thought, but instead con-
sists of a variety of fresh approaches to both old and new questions. This 
symposium does not include every dimension of Post-Chicago law and 
economics, but I hope that it conveys enough of its promise to intrigue 
readers to cast aside their stereotypes of economic analysis and to learn 
more. 
I am deeply grateful to my co-editor, Jules Coleman, whose tremen-
dous efforts on behalf of this symposium issue entitle him to a lion's share 
of the credit for its success. Jules and I both thank the symposium con-
tributors for their excellent papers and the Illinois Institute of Technol-
ogy, Chicago-Kent College of Law for graciously providing us with a 
forum for what we hope is an important and provocative discussion. Fi-
nally, we are most appreciative to the student members of the Chicago-
Kent Law Review for doing the "real" editing of this issue. In particular, 
we thank Editor-in-Chief Steve Wood for his unstinting enthusiasm and 
cooperation. Let those who doubt that students and faculty can amica-
bly collaborate in an important scholarly endeavor come to Chicago-
Kent. 
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